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Abstract: This paper, which is the Part II of a bipartite series, critically reviews the structural 
and implementation issues around the new Nigerian Labour, Safety, Health and Welfare 
(LSHW) Bill (2012). The study uses the vast Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) 
management experiences gained by UK, USA, Australia and China as bases for 
reviewing the LSHW Bill. The paper identifi es some of the potential OSH management 
opportunities, challenges and some practical lessons for countries seeking to adopt 
a more centralised and result oriented OSH regulatory model. Nigeria is used as 
a reference case study only; most of the recommendations made may be useful to other 
developing countries.
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Review article
Introduction
Part I (Abubakar, 2015) of this two-part series 
reviewed and identifi ed key factors behind the 
development of the Occupational Safety and Health 
(OSH) frameworks of UK, USA, Australia and 
China considering Nigerian as a reference case study. 
However, that study did not assess Nigeria’s OSH 
standing against the provisions of the new Nigerian 
Labour, Safety, Health and Welfare (LSHW) Bill of 
2012. This paper (i.e. Part II of the series) critically 
reviews the new LSHW Bill, which was passed by 
the Nigerian National Assembly (NASS) in 2012 
(NASS, Session No. 17, 2012). The new LSHW Bill 
seeks to repeal the rather weak Factories Act which 
has so far proved quite inadequate. In particular, this 
paper sets out to answer the questions, how does 
Nigerian OSH regulatory system work? What are 
some of the key concerns associated with the new 
Bill? What lessons could be learnt from countries 
with advanced OSH models? And most importantly, 
how can Nigeria and other developing countries take 
these lessons on board going forward?
Over the decades, a number of industrialised 
countries have suffered series of catastrophic 
work-related disasters. Systematic and random 
precursors, including human factors, which often 
combine in some complex ways, are behind most of 
such incidents (Abubakar et al., 2015a; Abubakar et 
al., 2015b). These countries have eventually learned 
their lessons the hard way. They have painstakingly 
and at enormous costs developed OSH regulatory 
frameworks, standards and work cultures that could 
benefi t the rest of the world, especially the developing 
economies. Nigeria, and indeed other developing 
countries, has no justifi cation whatsoever to repeat 
such disastrous mistakes. The developing countries 
have both economic and moral responsibilities to 
learn lessons from the experiences of those countries 
affected. 
OSH Regulatory & Enforcement frameworks of 
most developing countries are typically poor relative 
to those of the so called developed countries. For 
instance, a number of researchers have identifi ed the 
defi ciencies in the current Nigerian OSH regulatory 
regime, which include: lack of enabling legislations, 
underfunding, lack of skilled regulators, etc. (Idoro, 
2011; Diugwu et al., 2012; Idubor and Oisamoje, 
2013; Umeokafor et al., 2014). Unlike Nigeria, each 
of UK, U.S, Australia and China has graduated from 
the use of what may be termed Distributed OSH 
(DOSH) regulatory framework. DOSH regulatory 
framework leverages on multiple and less coherent 
legal provisions dispersed in various related laws 
such as the Factories, Labour and Compensation 
laws in addition to national constitution. In the other 
hand, the Consolidated OSH (COSH) regulatory 
framework refers to a relatively harmonised 
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regulatory and enforcement framework which 
comes with mandate expansion, enrichment of 
regulations, increased regulator powers, more 
budgetary allocations as well as enhanced executive 
and fi nancial independence. These are the pillars of 
any properly functioning OSH regulatory agency. 
U.S, UK, Australia and China went through 
their transition (switched from DOSH to COSH 
regime) in 1970, 1974, 2002 and 2008 respectively 
(Milligan, 1971; Parliament, 1974; ILO Offi ce for 
China and Mongolia, 2012; SWA, 2008). However, 
OSH management in China, which relies heavily 
on national laws, is still largely based on the 
presidential order No.70 of 2002 (ILO Offi ce for 
China and Mongolia, 2012). Presently, Nigeria, 
through the Inspectorate Division of the Federal 
Ministry of Labour and Productivity (ID – FMLP), 
is still using the DOSH regulatory framework. 
Currently, Nigeria’s OSH regulatory system lacks 
those rudimentary provisions obtainable under 
the COSH frameworks (BK and Okafor, 2013; 
Idubor and Oisamoje, 2013). With these problems 
deep-rooted in Nigerian OSH management system, 
it is no coincidence that the OSH performance 
indices for Nigeria have been so bad. 
No doubt, Nigeria has acknowledged the need 
to review and consolidate its OSH regulatory 
framework. In fact, such awakening led to the 
passage of the LSHW Bill in 2012 (Nigerian 
NASS, Session No. 17, 2012). After making a law, 
implementation of such law is the next logical step. 
This often presents some practical challenges with 
some of them emanating from the legal framework 
itself due to inadvertent fl aws. Identifying and 
addressing such issues as well as the potential legal 
pitfalls is very crucial and must be very timely; this 
paper addresses this research front. Nigeria is only 
used as a representative case study; the observations 
and conclusions made at the end of this paper are 
generic and may be useful to other countries seeking 
to switch from Distributed to Consolidated OHS 
regulatory regime.
Materials and methods
While Part I (Abubakar, 2015) of this series 
addressed the past and present issues affecting 
Nigerian OSH system; this paper considers the next 
Nigeria’s OSH regime with a view to identifying 
legislative concerns, top priorities and potential 
challenges in implementing the new LSHW Bill 
(2012), among others. The study considers the 
following broad themes:
• Critical review of the new LSHW Bill (2012), 
with emphasis on the following:
- overall background, loopholes and structure of 
LSHW Bill (2012);
- Agencies established by the LSHW Bill (2012) 
and their prescribed functions;
- categorization of OSH management stakeholders;
- a pictorial representation of the prospective 
OSH management framework based on the 
provisions of the new LSHW Bill (2012);
- Examples of Nigerian agencies governed by 
specifi c international treaty(ies).
• Resource scarcity, scope defi nition for the agencies 
and potential for jurisdictional confl icts.
• Structural defi ciency/loophole with potential to 
affect the effi ciency of the new OSH regulatory 
regime.
• Prescriptive, Goal setting or Mixed OSH 
regulatory model – way forward.
• Finally, a summary list of the key lessons is 
given along with suggestions on how each of the 
highlighted concerns can be addressed. 
• References are fi nally given to facilitate further 
readings. 
Overall, the research outputs are articulated to 
provide a robust take off ground for Nigeria and 
other countries seeking to switch from Distributed 
to Consolidated OSH management model.
Results: Review and Discussions
New Nigerian OSH law, new beginning
Labour, Safety, Health and Welfare (LSHW) 
Bill (2012) (Nigerian NASS, Session No. 17, 2012), 
which is a Bill for an Act seeking to consolidate 
and enhance the mandates of the current OSH 
regulatory regime, was passed in September, 2012 
by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria. LSHW Bill is still awaiting presidential 
assent at the time of preparing this paper. The Bill 
is intended to stand as a comprehensive and robust 
legal apparatus for management of OSH matters in 
all workplaces - both formal and informal. 
In a Plenary Session, the National Assembly 
considered a total of 112 recommendations raised by 
the Joint Committee on Employment; Labour and 
Productivity; Health and Establishment & Public 
Services. These recommendations served as the 
bases for the LSHW Bill (2012). In all, the Bill has 
15 Parts. Six out of the 112 recommendations were 
amended, these are: Clauses No. 2, 18, 22, 24, 42 
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and 93. One recommendation i.e. clause No. 58 was 
rejected while the remaining 105 recommendations 
were accepted and passed. LSHW Bill (2012) 
establishes a central regulatory and enforcement 
framework comprising the National Council 
for Occupational Safety and Health (NCOSH), 
NCOSH Governing Board and the National Institute 
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). 
According to the new Bill, NCOSH will be the 
focal regulatory and enforcing agency which will be 
supervised directly by a Governing Board.
A cursory review of the Bill indicates that Part 2 
was either skipped in error or assumed to be merged 
with other part(s) which was not explicitly indicated 
in the Bill. Part 7 was transposed to the space 
between Parts 12 and 13. The Bill closes with three 
Schedules – the First Schedule covers supplementary 
provisions such as the acceptable quorum for 
meetings and modalities for slating standing orders 
applicable to NIOSH and the NCOSH Governing 
Board. Second Schedule deals with the transitional 
provisions relating to the employees, assets and 
liabilities of NIOSH while the Third Schedule gives 
a rundown of the major hazardous chemicals and 
installations. Also, according to Part B of the Third 
Schedule, which provides a summary of the Senate 
proceedings, Section 91 was considered to be one 
of the accepted recommendations. However, like 
Section 58, Section 91 was meant to be left out of the 
Bill as agreed to earlier which was mentioned in the 
deliberation notes under Section 91. It was not clear 
why the Section was later shown to be accepted 
under the Third Schedule. 
According to Section 7(1) of the LSHW 
Bill (2012), NCOSH Governing Board will be 
constituted by about 25 members comprising the 
Board Chairperson; 9 Cognate Federal Ministries; 
6 representatives of State Governments (one 
person from each of the 6 Geopolitical Zones); 
2 representatives of the most relevant Employers’ 
Associations; 6 representatives of OSH Professional 
Bodies/Civil Society Groups and 1 representative of 
the Executive Secretary of the NCOSH.
On the other hand, NIOSH is a research based 
institute which will complement NCOSH. The 
mandate for confl ict resolution between regulators 
and duty holders is assigned to the National Industrial 
Court of Nigeria (NICN). Main functions of the new 
quadripartite OSH management system include: 
• Registration of workplaces;
• Development or adoption of OSH legislations, 
standards and national policies/strategies;
• Enforcement of OSH provisions;
• Inspection of workplaces;
• Research on OSH matters;
• Providing Education, training, enlightenment, 
consultancy services (to industries, movement 
agencies and general public);
• Development of OSH national databank; 
• Reconciling national and international OSH 
related interests, treaties and conventions;
• Harmonizing and streamlining the activities of 
various OSH professional bodies; 
• OSH related confl ict resolutions among 
stakeholders.
Each of NCOSH, NIOSH, NCOSH Governing 
Board and the NICN has varying mandates/powers, 
ranging from none to full, in carrying out each of the 
above functions.
Unlike NIOSH, which will be under the 
Minster of Labour and Productivity, NCOSH is 
a non-ministerial body reporting directly to the 
President, (Section 22 of the LSHW Bill (2012) as 
amended) (Nigerian NASS, Session No. 17, 2012). 
Also, budget of NCOSH will be appropriated by 
the National Assembly (Nigerian NASS, Session 
No. 17, 2012). In addition, NCOSH has the mandate 
to generate incomes through regulatory citations 
and voluntary donations. Based on the provisions 
of the new Bill, this study highlights some of the 
specifi c functions of each of NCOSH and NIOSH 
including some of the joint mandates. These 
functions/mandates are briefl y described in Tab. 1. It 
is important to note that this is a cursory extraction 
exercise and is by no means intended to be holistic. 
In summary, while NCOSH is designated 
as the central regulatory and enforcement 
(i.e. the Executive) arm of the new quadripartite 
OSH management regime, NIOSH, which is 
to be supervised by the Minister of Labour and 
Productivity, will provide research based OSH 
related recommendations, supports NCOSH 
towards the development of a National Information 
Management System (NIMS) and also oversee the 
workplace health issues in collaboration with the 
Federal Ministry of Health. The Governing Board 
is mandated to supervise the activities of NCOSH. 
NICN, on the other hand, has the mandate to resolve 
disputes between the regulators and the duty holders.
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A close look at the new Bill reveals a national 
OSH regulatory strategy that is more articulate and 
coordinated. Overall, LSHW Bill (2012) seeks to 
usher in an overarching and more enabling OSH 
regulatory regime. For instance, LSHW Bill (2012) 
covers construction industry which was not enshrined 
in the Factories Act, makes provisions for more 
stringent fi nes, longer jail terms for contraveners 
and confers more succinct & enabling powers to 
the regulators. In addition, the new management 
Tab. 1 Some specifi c and joint functions of the NCOSH & NIOSH based on LSHW Bill (2012) (Nigerian NASS, 
Session No. 17, 2012)
NCOSH NIOSH NCOSH and NIOSH
To be headed by an Executive Secretary 
(ES) (Section 14 (1), of the LSHW Bill 
(2012)), NCOSH is a largely operations-
oriented body that develops, enforces OSH 
regulations and sets standards applicable 
to all workplaces (among other functions) 
except those governed by specifi c 
international conventions and treaties, 
(Sections 12–13). 
To be headed by a Director General 
(DG) (Section 102(1), of the LSHW Bill 
(2012)), NIOSH is a research oriented 
body that identifi es and recommends 
OSH standards as well as enabling 
OSH regulations and policies to prevent 
workplace injuries and illnesses (Sections 
102–104). NIOSH is also mandated to 
liaise with the Federal Ministry of Health 
to regulate, monitor and evaluate medical 
practices with a view to promoting 
occupational health (Section 106).
Both the ES and the DG are to be 
appointed by Mr. President on the 
recommendation of the Minister of 
Labour and Productivity. Normally, 
each of the ES and the DG will hold 
offi ce for a term of 4 years in the fi rst 
instance and may be re-appointed 
for a further term of 4 years and no 
more.
(Sections 14 (1 & 2)); 102 (1 & 2), 
of the LSHW Bill (2012)).
NCOSH is required to prepare and submit 
September 30th report to the President, 
(National Assembly is no longer a recipient 
of this report based on Section 22 as 
amended). But NCOSH should submit 
estimate of its expected incomes and 
expenditure for the incoming year to 
the National Assembly (Section 20). 
NIOSH is required to submit September 
30th report to the National Assembly, 
Minister of Labour and Productivity 
and the President (Section 104).
R & D on OSH, education, trainings 
and conducting public enlightenment 
programmes (NCOSH- Section 96, 
NIOSH- Section 103).
Does not prepare June 30th report.
Each of NIOSH and Ministry of Labour 
and Productivity to prepare and submit 
a report before June 30th of every year to 
the President detailing activities 
in the preceding year and future plans/
requirements. The President transmits 
such report to the National Assembly 
(Section 110).
Development of standards 
including concepts and terminology 
interpretations.
NCOSH to establish the National 
Information Management System (NIMS) 
as a database holding relevant OSH incidents 
which shall be linked to the National Health 
Information Systems (NHIS) (Section 12(l)).
NIOSH to support the development of 
NIMS by working in partnership with 
the Federal Ministry of Health to provide 
relevant occupational accidents, injuries 
and disease information in the medical 
facilities nationwide (Section 105).
Inspection (NIOSH conducts 
inspection on behalf of the Minister 
of Labour (Section 102 (1) pursuant 
to Section 99).
Unlike NIOSH, NCOSH is not required to 
submit industry-wide status report after two 
years of its start-up.
On behalf of the Minister of labour, 
NIOSH to review and publish industry 
wide status of the effect of chronic 
or low-level exposure to industrial 
materials, within two years of start-up of 
the institute and annually thereafter.
Budgets for implementation of the 
LSHW Bill (after enactment) 
to be appropriated by the National 
Assembly (Section 111) for each 
of NCOSH and NIOSH.
NCOSH will be supervised directly by 
a Governing Board which will be headed 
by a Chairperson. The Board, which will 
operate on part-time basis, is saddled with 
the responsibility to check and regulate 
the NCOSH, formulate national OSH 
management framework and grants specifi c 
approvals, as appropriate, to NCOSH, among 
others.
Functions of NIOSH will be overseen 
directly by the Minster of Labour Matters 
who the DG represents (Section 102 (1)).
In an event where a duty holder 
contests enforcement or citation, such 
confl icts between NCOSH/NIOSH 
and the concerned duty holder are 
to be entertained by the National 
Industrial Court of Nigeria.
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and answerability structure offers more budgetary 
expenditure and executive independence to the new 
regulatory system. The new Bill brings together 
a number of OSH management stakeholders with 
diverse backgrounds and degrees of engagements 
and sets out to establish stronger coordination 
and interactions amongst the stakeholders. For 
the purposes of this study, OSH management 
stakeholders in Nigeria have been divided into four 
broad categories, thus:
a) Agencies/organizations governed signifi cantly by 
International Treaties/Conventions;
b) Government agencies with devolved mandate for 
specifi c risk management;
c) Other national stakeholders;
d) International stakeholders.
Five model examples on each of the four 
categories are given in Fig. 1. It is important to 
note that this schematic does not portray hierarchy 
or complete intra-communication fl ow directions. 
Provisions of the LSHW Bill (2012) are applicable 
to all workplaces except those agencies established 
for the purposes of meeting specifi c international 
treaties or conventions (see Section 3 of the LSHW 
Bill (2012) (Nigerian NASS, Session No. 17, 2012)). 
LSWH Bill does not explicitly name such 
agencies. However, typically, some of these 
specialised agencies could be as shown in Tab. 2:
No doubt, the new OSH regulatory regime 
will have to work closely with all the stakeholders 
mentioned above including those agencies governed 
by certain international treaties (examples are given 
in Tab. 2). International treaties or conventions 
usually specify generic criteria which could be 
considered by member countries as bare minimum 
depending on the extent to which the convention is 
ratifi ed. For instance, like Nigeria, UK is a signatory 
to the Convention on International Civil Aviation 
(CICA) which sets out to regulate aviation safety, 
among others. However, performance standards 
setting/revisions, inspections and regulation of 
offshore helidecks are carried out jointly by the UK 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and the UK HSE 
even though UK CAA is mandated to enforce the 
CICA (UK Civil Aviation Authority, 2013). Other 
high OSH risk yet quite specialised agencies are: 
the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Mining 
industry. Regulating OSH in these sectors will 
require signifi cant inputs from the resident experts 
in each of the sectors in question. Identifi cation of 
such agencies and defi ning the common grounds 
devoid of trespass is one of the key issues to address 
upfront. This issue and a range of other potential 
OSH management challenges and possible ways 
forward are discussed in the following sections.
Fig. 1 An Outlook of the Prospective Nigerian OSH Management Framework Refl ecting the Provisions 
of the New Bill (LSHW Bill (2012)
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Resource scarcity, ill-defi ned scope 
and jurisdictional confl icts
According to Section 3 of the LSHW Bill 
(Nigerian NASS, Session No. 17, 2012), with 
the exception of Government agencies governed 
by international treaties or Conventions, the Bill 
applies to all workplaces, employees and employers 
including the self-employed (Section 30 (3)) as well 
as the local Government employees (Section 95). In 
addition, with the exception of the Compensation 
Act (2010) and the Factories Act (Cap Fl 2004), 
which are specifi cally named and exempted in 
Sections 30(3) and 93 respectively, the LSHW Bill 
does not explicitly name other exempted bodies or 
extant legal provisions that should remain in force 
after the kickoff of the new law. This scope is not 
only particularly extensive; its boundaries also 
appear to be loosely defi ned. The implication is that 
the new regulatory agencies will need huge amount 
of resources in terms of trained multidisciplinary 
workforce and commensurate fi nancial budgets 
which may not be available for an agency of that 
standing. Secondly, there is the potential for the new 
OSH regulatory regime to fi nd itself squaring up with 
a number of agencies in the course of discharging its 
mandates.
To a very large extent, the new Bill refl ects the 
features of the U.S OSHA Act of 1970 but fails to 
adopt some of the scoping provisions articulated in 
that Act. For instance, Section 4 of the U.S OSHA 
Act (Milligan, 1971) clearly spells out exempted 
jurisdictions such as Atomic Energy Acts which 
established the defunct Atomic Energy Commission 
(now called Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 
and Workmen’s Compensation Acts. The section, 
which is titled “Applicability of this Act”, gives 
a rundown of the excluded extant laws and this is 
very important. 
Similarly, UK identifi es three broad categories of 
OSH enforcing bodies namely: the HSE which is the 
central OSH regulatory body, the local Government 
authorities and ‘Others’; scope of each of these 
agencies is relatively well defi ned as highlighted 
below: 
• HSE,UK (the OSH focal authority)
 HSE mainly covers workplaces that have broad 
national implications such as: factories, farms, 
building sites, mines, schools/colleges, and power 
generation systems, central & local Government 
premises as well as oil & gas installations.
• Local Government authorities
 Local Governments cover certain local business 
units such as shops, hotels, restaurants, leisure 
premises, nurseries/playgroups, pubs/clubs 
and places of worship. The local Governments 
authorities also cover dangerous buildings (built), 
as well as issues such as pollution and poor food 
hygiene matters.  
• ‘Other’ enforcement Agencies
 The ‘Other’ category of enforcement agencies 
comprises: (a) agencies with mandate to enforce 
OSH regulation based on specifi c international 
conventions and (b) those enforcing OSH 
regulations based on specifi c national regulations. 
Examples under sub-category (a) are: maritime 
OSH laws (enforced by Maritime and Coastguard 
agencies) and nuclear/atomic safety laws 
Agency governed by specifi c Int’l 
agreement/ convention/Treaty Example(s) of International agreement/ convention/Treaty
• Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory
Convention on Early Notifi cation of a Nuclear Accident, signed in 1987 
ratifi ed and enforced in 1990 (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2014) 
and Convention on Nuclear Safety, signed in 1994 ratifi ed and enforced 
in 2007(International Atomic Energy Agency, 2015).
• National Oil Spill Detection and 
Response Agency (NOSDRA)
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and 
Cooperation (OPRC 90) (Nwilo and Badejo, 2006).
• Nigerian Maritime Administration and 
Safety Agency (NIMASA)
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1974), signed 1981 
which was ratifi ed in 2004 (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004).
• Nigeria Atomic Energy Commission 
(NAEC)
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), open for signatures 
in 1996; Nigeria signed CTBT in 2000 and ratifi ed same in 2001 
(Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), http://ctbto.org/specials/
who-we-are/).
• Nigeria – São Tomé and Príncipe Joint 
Development Authority (specifi cally, OSH 
management in the Joint Development 
Zone i.e. Bight of Bonny)
Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe Bilateral 
Treaty (2002) (Nigeria–São Tomé and Príncipe Joint Development Authority, 
http://www.nstpjda.com/#).
Tab. 2 Examples of Nigerian agencies signifi cantly infl uenced by international treaty(ies)
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(enforced by the Offi ce for Nuclear Regulation). 
Examples under sub-category (b) are: road traffi c 
laws (enforced by Police), railway OSH laws 
(enforced by Offi ce of Rail Regulation) and waste 
disposal & contaminated ground laws (enforced 
by Environmental Agency), etc. (UK HSE’s 
responsibilities, http://www.hse.gov.uk/contact/
authority.htm).
A special functional delegation and scoping 
approach may be seen in Australian model where the 
central OSH body (SWA) is limited to OSH policy 
and regulations making activities only. Enforcement 
is the reasonability of the states and territories. This 
appears to be similar to the situation in China where 
considerable enforcement powers are devolved to 
the regional Governments and provinces. Overall, 
each of these countries appears to handout relatively 
clear scope to their respective OSH focal regulatory 
body.
Systematic scoping is very necessary for proper 
functioning of the focal OSH regulatory body. This 
will allow the body to focus its fi nite resources on 
those strategic areas with broad national impacts and 
also forestall potential functional confl icts among 
related agencies which were also established by 
some legal pronouncements. 
A legal loophole with potential 
to undermine the proposed OSH 
databank (NIMS) 
Sections 11(l) and 105 of the LSWH Bill stipulate 
the need to establish a dedicated OSH databank 
called the National Information Management 
System (NIMS) which shall be linked to the National 
Health Information Systems (NHIS) (Section 12(l)). 
Section 35(2) requires that work-related accidents 
resulting in death or permanent disability must be 
reported to NCOSH within 7 days of occurrence, 
which is reasonable. However, Section 35(1) 
requires employer to report certain incidents such 
as accidents that incapacitated an employee for 
3 or more days and dangerous occurrences before 
31st of March, every year. With this very large time 
allowance, reports could potentially sit idly with 
the employers for nearly a year. This is not good 
practice especially in this age of IT where the duty 
holders may only be a few clicks away from the 
NIMS website. With this provision, NIMS may only 
be able to hold complete records for incidents that 
occurred within the preceding administrative year. 
Potentially, this problem could stand as one of the 
major factors to militate against the development of 
the new platform at least in terms of currency.
Now, to put this into perspective, in the UK, 
an incident must be reported within 10 days of 
its occurrence and maximum of 15 days if such 
incident incapacitated the worker for more than 
7 days (UK HSE, http://www.hse.gov.uk/riddor/
when-do-i-report.htm). In the U.S, work-related 
death must be reported to OSHA within 8 hours and 
any occupational accidents resulting in inpatient 
hospitalization must be reported within 24 hours 
(USA OSHA Record Keeping System, https://
www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/). Clear and rational 
instructions like these are essential for effi cient data 
gathering.
Prescriptive or goal setting OSH 
regulatory model
The prescriptive (or rule based) model sets 
OSH performance criteria for the duty holders and 
also defi nes means of achieving the set targets. On 
the other hand, the goal setting (or safety case) 
approach sets target and shifts the onus of proof of 
compliance to the duty holder who is responsible 
for creating the risk initially. The proposed Nigerian 
OSH regulatory framework as enshrined in the 
LSWH Bill is predisposed largely towards the U.S 
OSH management model, which is fundamentally 
prescriptive. UK and Australia on the other hand 
have OSH regulatory regimes that are largely goal 
setting. However, Unlike Australia, which has 
recently adopted the goal setting approach, UK has 
tried the model for about 40 years now. U.S has also 
implemented the prescriptive approach for over 
40 years. This provides a simple unidimensional basis 
for comparing the goal setting and the prescriptive 
OSH regulatory models. The annual fatal accident 
rates of UK and U.S are 0.74 and 3.5 per 100, 000 
employees in 2011(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), 2012; UK HSE, http://www.hse.gov.uk/
statistics/pdf/fatalinjuries.pdf). UK seems to be 
doing quite well in terms of this measure which is 
one of the most vital OSH performance metrics used 
around the world. 
In fact, U.S appears to be looking towards UK’s 
OSH management model i.e. a largely goal setting 
regime. For instance, the U.S president had issued an 
executive order (No. 13563) in January 2011 tasking 
the OSH stakeholders to consider the prospects for 
U.S to adopt a more goal setting approach since 
the current largely prescriptive framework has not 
been quite successful (US Expert Forum, 2012). 
It is important to note that that presidential order 
came after testing the prescriptive model for about 
45 years. Nigeria and indeed other developing 
nations have valuable lesson here.
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Characteristically, the goal setting approach 
tends to put lesser burden on the regulators in 
terms of technical profi ciency. It also encourages 
the duty holders to own the risk and be creative 
in developing risk management strategies. With 
this arrangement, the regulator focuses on the 
broad policy making, reviewing safety reports and 
enforcing legal provisions. However, this does not 
in any way preclude the need and importance of 
competent and well-resourced OSH regulars. For 
instance, failure of the UK military aircraft, i.e. the 
RAF Nimrod MR2 (XV230) in 2006 in the airspace 
of Afghanistan is a typical example of what could 
happen if regulators are incompetent or have no 
adequate access to requisite expertise. In this case, 
a fl awed safety case was hastily approved. A post-
accident investigation team found that this misstep 
was among the root causes of the accident. The 
investigation revealed that the safety case which 
was submitted to the regulators to secure approval 
was actually riddled with errors and fundamentally 
defective in terms of facts and representation which 
were never picked up during the review exercise 
(Charles Haddon-Cave QC, 2009). All the 14 people 
on board died as a result of this accident. 
On the other hand, it is important to note that 
the goal setting regulatory regimes tend to put extra 
pressure on the inspectors in certain ways. For 
instance, inspectors would have to go through the 
safety case of nearly every asset prior to inspection 
visits and assess the workplace against its specifi c 
safety case report, this can be very demanding. The 
usual generic checklists are of little use here. Relative 
costs of implementing the goal setting regime, 
especially on the SMEs is another very important 
issue to consider. With these pros and cons in sight, 
it is clear that crafting out an optimised blend of 
these regulatory models would require some efforts.
Unlike the present section, which focuses mainly 
on identifi cation of problems, opportunities, and 
general comparative reviews; the following section 
summarises the key practical lessons and also 
answers the essential questions of implementation. 
Most importantly, leveraging on the experiences 
of the countries referred to in this paper and Part 
I of this series (Abubakar, 2015) , a number of 
recommendations are also made and highlighted 
accordingly. 
Conclusions: Lessons to Learn
Need for systematic scoping 
Giving the extent of coverage and the way in 
which the jurisdictional boundaries of the LSHW Bill 
(2012) are defi ned, systematic scoping is necessary 
to forestall potential confl icts amongst related 
agencies and resource based limitations. Therefore 
as a minimum, there is the need to, right from the 
outset, clearly identify the functional boundaries of 
the following:
• Agencies with mandate to uphold specifi c 
international treaties, conventions/ agreements 
(examples are given in Fig. 1 with further details 
given in Tab. 2);
• Agencies/organizations governed by national laws 
and empowered to carry out certain functions with 
OSH related features (examples are given in Fig. 1);
• Specifi c OSH regulatory functions need to be 
delegated to the Local Government Authorities (for 
instance, in the UK, local authorities cover certain 
businesses, examples are given in Section 3.2);
• Above all, clearer lines of demarcation between 
the mandates of NCOSH and NIOSH, including 
the common grounds, should be drawn (some 
guidance notes are given in Tab. 1). 
It is paramount to fi nd out means of shading 
delegable responsibilities and focusing the fi nite 
resources on those strategic workplaces that have 
broad national outlook and impact. However, care 
must be taken to avoid overstretching this provision 
which could easily result in mandate abdication.  
There is also the need for NCOSH, NIOSH 
and the NCOSH Governing Board to, within 
fi rst 2 - 3 years after take-off, set up a critical 
review committee which shall be charged with the 
responsibility of identifying potentially confl icting 
and/or duplicated legislations which may be sitting 
in various Ministries, Departments and Agencies 
across the country. Findings of such committee 
would provide basis for amendment of the incoming 
OSH Act (LSHW Act), this is necessary in order to 
foster harmony and coordination.
NIMS development - a priority 
Development of a rich and reliable NIMS is 
pivotal to the success of the new regulatory regime 
and should be a top priority. A number of issues 
will need to be addressed; some of these issues are 
highlighted hereunder:
• The provision that an employer is required to 
report certain incidents such as accidents that 
incapacitated an employee for 3 or more days 
and dangerous occurrences before 31st of March 
of every year (Section 35(1) LSHW BILL) 
(Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2012) is ill-defi ned 
and potentially counterproductive. With this 
provision, an incident that occurs in April could, 
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by law, remain unreported for nearly a year. Large 
number of incidents may be sitting unreported in 
organizations. In other words, NIMS may only 
be able to hold complete data sets for a preceding 
year; this makes it one year out of date by default. 
This is a considerable legal loophole and needs 
to be duly addressed (see subsection 3.3 for 
additional notes on how the UK and U.S handle 
this issue).
• Getting the right inputs in terms of quality and 
number requires much more than a sophisticated 
online data collection and presentation platform. 
Success of the NIMS will also depend on the 
extent to which the duty holders and the general 
public are engaged. As a minimum, the following 
questions need to be properly addressed: What 
incident should be reported? How should the 
incident be reported? Who should report the 
incident? Where the incident report should be sent 
to? And when the incident must be reported? The 
answers to these questions should be made very 
clear to both the duty holders and the general 
public.
• The new OSH regulatory agencies should also 
endeavour to be among the interest groups 
canvassing for timely enactment of the Whistle-
blower protection Bill which is still not in effect 
in Nigeria. Speedy development of NIMS will, no 
doubt, require the Whistle-blower protection law 
which is currently awaiting presidential assent 
(at the time of preparing this paper).
Standardization of defi nitions
There is the need to align concepts and 
terminology defi nitions with international 
best practices. This is necessary otherwise 
comparing Nigeria’s future standards and OSH 
management performance metrics to international 
outputs will be very diffi cult. Article No. 4 
of the ILO Convention requires any country 
that signed and ratifi ed the Convention to 
formulate, implement and periodically review 
a coherent national policy on occupational safety, 
occupational health and the working environment. 
Nigeria ratifi ed this convention in May 1994 (ILO, 
1981). Such standardization and alignment would 
provide stronger basis for fruitful engagements 
between Nigeria and other countries which is good 
for speedy OSH development. In addition, this 
would help foster uniform understanding among all 
OSH stakeholders including the general public. 
In addition, to aid compliance, there is the need 
to clearly draw lines between generic standards, 
which are applicable to all workplaces, the so called 
vertical standards (which are industry specifi c), 
performance standards and other approved codes of 
practice. This is necessary to forestall ignorance - 
based violations. 
Shortage of technical resources - need 
to partner with relevant bodies
No doubt, the new OSH regulatory regime will 
present high demand for OSH specialists. Both 
the regulators and the employers will need such 
experts as full time, part time staff members and/or 
as independent consultants; Nigeria has huge defi cit 
here. Going by the recommendation of the ILO, 
the new regulatory regime will need no less than 
1300 inspectors and about the same number of other 
staff members that are not functionally designed as 
inspectors such as policy advisers, technologists, 
legal advisers, information and communication 
specialists, statisticians and economists, scientists 
and medical experts (Abubakar, 2015). There is 
therefore the need to recruit and train people at home 
and abroad through some form of collaborations 
with international stakeholders especially the OSH 
focal authorities, research institutions and centres 
with track records of OSH development. Joint 
research & publications and knowledge exchange 
by co-organizing conferences, seminars, workshops 
and streaming of selected talks in form of webinars, 
podcasts, etc. are a key to addressing this problem. 
Federal Ministry of Education may also be 
encouraged to introduce tailored OSH topics in the 
curricula of certain courses across the country. In 
addition, through special consultations, Government 
Ministries, Departments and Agencies such as the 
Petroleum Technology Development Fund, National 
Information Technology Development Agency 
(NITDA) and the Federal Ministry of Education, 
which have the mandate to sponsor the studies of 
eligible Nigerians in some areas, may be encouraged 
to train more people in OSH related courses. In 
particular, NITDA has the mandate to sponsor IT 
related programmes, this could be very useful for 
the development of the NIMS which is stipulated by 
the LSHW Bill.
Need to regulate consultancy services 
and create central directory
Many duty holders may not have the resources 
in terms of time and/or depth of expertise required 
to manage risks and/or demonstrate compliance with 
the OSH regulations, and this normal. Practically, 
contracting consultants is about the only option 
left for them. Evidently, compliance with OSH 
regulations is heavily dependent on consultancy 
services. This means that OSH consultancy services 
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